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10K CHALLENGE/5K FUN RUN 
SEPTEMBER 28, 2002 
 
 
NEW OFFENCE FOR DISARMING 
A POLICE OFFICER 
 
Effective July 23, 2002, a 
new Criminal Code provision 
was added creating a dual Proceeds donated to BC 
Special Olympics. 
$10,000 in prizes 
including: 
 
• Annual Apollo Memberships 
• 2 bikes from Wal-Mart 
• Boston Pizza School Pizza Parties 
• West Jet flight for two 
• $1000 in prizes from A&B sound 
• $500 in prizes from the Optimist Club 
• Fraserway RV rental 
• Ramada Inns accommodations 
• Woodland’s at Sunpeaks get-away 










1. LOG ON: http://www.abbotsfordpolice.org and 
print out a registration form 
2. E-MAIL: kjones@city.abbotsford.bc.ca 
3. TELEPHONE: 604-859-5225 or 1-800-898 –6111 




Log on: http://www.abbotsfordpolice.org to find out 





1. Regular: to September 15 
2. Late: September 16-September 26 
3. Race Day: September 28, 7am-8am 
$$$ Register Early & Save $$$ 
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5 years in prison for persons 
who attempt to disarm a peace officer. The new s.270.1 
reads as follows: 
 
s.270.1 Criminal Code  
(1) Every one commits an offence who, without the consent of 
a peace officer, takes or attempts to take a weapon that is in 
the possession of the peace officer when the peace officer is 
engaged in the execution of his or her duty.  
(2) For the purpose of subsection (1), "weapon" means any 
thing that is designed to be used to cause injury or death to, 
or to temporarily incapacitate, a person.  
(3) Every one who commits an offence under subsection (1) is 
guilty of  
(a) an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term 
of not more than five years; or 
(b an offence punishable on summary conviction and liable to 
imprisonment for a term of not more than eighteen months. 
 
SASKATCHEWAN’S TOP COURT 
DIVIDED ON RANDOM DUAL 
PURPOSE TRAFFIC STOPS 
R. v. Ladouceur, 2002 SKCA 73 
 
A Saskatchewan detachment of the 
RCMP set up a vehicle check stop 
program at a weigh scale on the Trans 
Canada Highway code named 
“Operation Recovery”. In addition to 
highway traffic safety, the police were also conducting 
these stops to interdict drugs, tobacco, firearms, 
alcohol, wildlife, and other provincial and criminal 
offences. Others present at the check stop included 
Customs and Immigration officials, Highway Transport 
Patrol, and Saskatchewan Finance Field enforcement 
officers. As the accused approached the check-point in a 
station wagon, an officer observed his unrestrained 
 passenger make some “strange movements” and lean 
forward with his hands down. A sergeant stopped the 
vehicle and the accused produced a valid Ontario driver’s 
licence, a photocopy of the vehicle’s registration, and a 
rental agreement for the vehicle designating the 
passenger as the only authorized driver. Both men were 
acting nervously and avoiding eye contact. The officer 
noted a strong smell of air freshener accompanied by a 
second strange, but unidentifiable odour. The accused 
was directed into the secondary staging area because he 
was not listed as the driver on the rental agreement and 
because the sergeant wanted to make further enquiries 
on both men and into the masking of the strange odour.  
 
The officer sought further assistance from a constable 
because he wanted to question the men separately and 
compare their stories. After asking the accused to exit 
the vehicle and checking the brakes, the sergeant 
further questioned him while the constable requested 
identification from the passenger, who remained 
seated in the vehicle, because he was not wearing his 
seatbelt. The passenger acted nervously, avoided eye 
contact, and his hands were shaking as he passed his 
driver’s licence to the officer. While speaking to the 
passenger, the constable detected an odour of fresh 
marihuana and observed an air freshener bottle and a 
small piece of marihuana plant like material on the 
console of the car. Also noted were a plant like flake, a 
package of rolling papers, and a pair of scissors lying on 
the floor. Police conducted CPIC enquiries of the men 
and learned that the passenger had a previous 
conviction for possession of marihuana. After 
conferring with one another, the officers determined 
there were reasonable grounds to arrest the men for 
possession of marihuana. As the constable returned the 
passenger’s identification to him, he detected a strong 
smell of marihuana and observed a partially burned 
cigarette in the ashtray. The two were arrested for 
possession of a controlled substance and advised of 
their rights. Following the arrests, the police searched 
the car and found a hockey bag in the hatch area of the 
vehicle containing 4.55 kgs. of marihuana with an 
estimated street value of $30,000. 
 
At trial, the charge of possession of a controlled 
substance for the purpose of trafficking was dismissed 
after the trial judge excluded the evidence. Since he 
could find no authority that would allow the police to 
randomly stop motorists beyond highway safety 
matters to check for drugs, tobacco, firearms, alcohol, 
or any other infractions under provincial legislation or 
the Criminal Code, he concluded that the police 
arbitrarily detained the accused in violation of s.9 of 
the Charter. The Crown appealed the dismissal of the 
charges to the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal arguing 
that the trial judge erred.  
 
An Unlawful Stop? 
 
In a 2:1 decision, Saskatchewan’s highest court 
dismissed the Crown’s appeal. Justice Jackson 
examined the law and concluded that the police do have 
the authority to randomly and arbitrarily stop vehicles 
at common law as part of an organized check-stop 
program designed to reduce impaired driving or where 
provincial legislation permits the random stopping of 
motorists, whether as part of an organized program or 
not. Such stops, although arbitrary, are saved by s.1 of 
the Charter as being a reasonable limit demonstrably 
justified in a free and democratic society to address 
the pressing and substantial concern of highway safety. 
He also held that an additional authority under the 
common law would allow the police, if they have an 
articulable cause to believe an offence has been 
committed, to stop the vehicle and make limited 
enquiries.  On the other hand, if the sole purpose of 
the random traffic stop is checking for possible 
unknown, non-traffic related crimes, the police cannot 
rely on motor vehicle legislation. Furthermore, if the 
police combine the checking for illegal contraband with 
a random check-stop program for motor vehicle 
infractions, the arbitrary detention is no longer saved 
by s.1.  
 
In this case, “Operation Recovery” had been designed 
for the express purpose of determining whether other 
crimes, in addition to motor vehicle offences, had been 
committed. By relying on the check-stop program for 
reasons of vehicle safety, the police were improperly 
attempting to acquire grounds for arrest. Justice 
Jackson concluded that “Operation Recovery was 
intended to be a comprehensive check for criminal 
activity that could be investigated by stopping all cars 
on the Transcanada highway” and  “the law does not 
authorize the police to conduct a random check-stop 
operation which has one of its purposes an investigation 
or search for possible illegal contraband”. Hence, the 
detention was arbitrary and the evidence was properly 
excluded. He further cautioned that ordinary Canadians 
should not be subjected to intrusive searches, as one 
might expect at border crossings, on domestic 
highways under the guise of vehicle safety. Justice 
Jackson found that the accused’s right to be free from 
Volume 2 Issue 8 
August 2002 
2
 arbitrary detention was breached and could not be 
cleansed by s.1.  
 
Chief Justice Bayda concurred with Justice Jackson, 
and found that all check-stops result in an arbitrary 
detention. He agreed that if the aim is for highway 
traffic safety (sobriety, licences, ownership, insurance, 
and mechanical fitness of cars), the Charter breach is 
saved. In contrast, if the stop is for “the general 
detection of crime or the indiscriminate identification 
of criminals using the highway”, the stop is unlawful. 
Chief Justice Bayda concluded that these two aims 
cannot operate together. In short, where one aim 
(traffic safety) of the random check-stop is lawful, a 
secondary unlawful purpose (general crime control) 
would render the entire stop unlawful.  
 
A Lawful Stop? 
 
Justice Tallis disagreed with the majority. He found 
that the police are entitled to randomly stop motor 
vehicles for the purpose of enforcing highway and 
safety related regulations, which includes the 
enforcement of numerous provincial statutes and 
Criminal Code provisions related to impaired driving. 
Although these broad purposes result in an arbitrary 
detention, the random stops are constitutional because 
they are saved by s.1 of the Charter.  Justice Tallis 
reasoned that the purpose of this stop was properly 
grounded in the police powers of enforcing highway and 
safety related regulations and was not used “as a mere 
ruse to embark on an invalid search of the vehicle”.  
Any other powers incidentally exercised to enforce 
other enactments were exercised in accordance with 
the law.   
 
While in the course of their duties during this valid 
stop, the officers were entitled to use “their 
perceptory senses of sight and smell” to detect 
criminal wrongdoing. The “police are not expected to 
turn a blind eye to the commission of other offences” 
and would be derelict in their duties if they did. Here, 
the officers conducted themselves within the spirit 
and primary aim of a highway safety stop--it was not 
flawed, was lawful from the beginning, and was not used 
for any improper purpose. The officers’ observations 
accumulated during the random stop provided 
reasonable grounds for a search. Further, the police 
had exigent circumstances to undertake the search 
under s.11 of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act 
or s.487.11 of the Criminal Code because of the 
mobility of the vehicle.  Justice Tallis would have 
allowed the appeal and directed a new trial with the 
evidence being admissible.  
 
Complete case available at www.lawsociety.sk.ca 
 
Editor’s Note: There have been other provincial 
appellate decisions addressing similar issues. In Brown 
v. Durham Regional Police Force (1998) 131 C.C.C. (3d) 1 
(Ont.C.A.), the police set up a check-stop on a road 
leading to a motorcycle club’s property where the police 
learned they were planning on holding a weekend party. 
Anyone believed to be heading to or from the property, 
anyone driving a Harley Davidson motorcycle, and 
anyone wearing the insignia of a motorcycle club was 
stopped. Their driver’s licences, ownership papers, and 
insurance documents were checked on CPIC. 
Furthermore, their vehicles and equipment were also 
inspected to ensure compliance with motor vehicle 
legislation. The stops were videotaped and used to 
gather police intelligence. The Ontario Court of Appeal, 
in a unanimous judgment, found that the stops were 
properly circumscribed within the ambit of highway 
traffic concerns. The fact that the police were also 
interested in knowing the identity of those connected 
to organized crime did not make the stop unlawful. 
Provided any co-existing police purpose was proper, 
such as maintaining the public peace, investigating 
other criminal activity, or intelligence gathering, the 
stops remained lawful. However, had the collateral 
purpose been improper or violated the constitutional 
rights of the detainee, such as stopping someone based 
on colour or gender, the entire stop would have been 
rendered unlawful. 
 
In R. v. Guenette (1999) 136 C.C.C. (3d) 311 (Que.C.A.), 
a police officer used the powers under Quebec’s 
Highway Safety Code to investigate his suspicions that 
the accused, who was seated behind the wheel of his 
parked car in front of a restaurant with his engine 
running and his lights off, might be about to commit a 
burglary. When asked to identify himself, the accused 
provided a false name and was subsequently acquitted 
at trial of obstructing a police officer in the lawful 
execution of his duty. The Crown appealed to the 
Quebec Court of Appeal which, in a 2:1 decision 
dismissed the appeal. Justices Fish and Nuss held that 
the officer used a statutory power to stop the vehicle 
for a reason entirely unrelated to highway traffic 
purposes.  In other words, the officer used the 
Highway Safety Code as a pretext or subterfuge in an 
attempt to justify the stop. The stop of the accused 
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 was arbitrary and the officer was therefore not in the 
lawful execution of his duty.  
 
Justice Pigeon, in his minority opinion, held that the 
Highway Safety Code permits the police to randomly 
stop driver’s to check for licences, ownership, 
insurance, and mechanical fitness. Moreover, the 
officer was entitled to carry out a “routine enquiry” 
under the motor vehicle legislation even though he had 
“vague suspicions that the driver was getting ready or 
had committed an offence under the Criminal Code”.  
He described the officer as wearing two hats when he 
makes a stop—responsible for both enforcement of 
highway safety and the Criminal Code. In recognizing 
that the Highway Safety Code permits routine stops 
but the Criminal Code does not, as long as the officer 
limits his intervention with the driver to what is 
permitted under the Highway Safety Code he is 
entitled to act. The police cannot however, use the 
provincial traffic legislation to carry out a general 
investigation or to search a vehicle. Since the officer 
limited his inquiry to the objectives permitted by the 
motor vehicle statute, in Justice Pigeon’s view he was 
acting lawfully and the accused should have been 
convicted. 
 
In R. v. Simpson (1993) 79 C.C.C. (3d) 482 (Ont.C.A.), 
the police stopped the accused after the vehicle in 
which he was a passenger had driven away from a 
suspected crack house. The accused was asked to exit 
the vehicle and a baggie of cocaine was subsequently 
seized. He was convicted of possession of cocaine for 
the purpose of trafficking but appealed to the Ontario 
Court of Appeal. The officer who stopped the accused’s 
vehicle did so for investigative reasons entirely 
unconnected with reasons related to enforcing driving 
related laws. Justice Doherty, for a unanimous Court, 
held that “once…road safety concerns are removed as a 
basis for the stop, then the powers associated with and 
predicated upon those particular concerns cannot be 
relied upon to legitimize the stop”. If the stop is 
unrelated to highway safety, the police cannot use the 
Highway Traffic Act to detain a person for an 
investigation simply because they are the occupant of a 
motor vehicle.   
 
Finally, in R. v. Montour and Longboat [1995] 2 S.C.R. 
416, the Supreme Court of Canada restored a trial 
judge’s decision to exclude evidence that was later 
overturned by the New Brunswick Court of Appeal. In 
that case, police officers stopped the accused who 
were the occupants of a van being driven on a highway. 
In the back of the van police observed tobacco 
products and the accused were arrested. A search 
warrant was subsequently issued, tobacco seized, and 
the accused charged with Excise Act offences. The 
trial judge concluded that the officer did not stop the 
van for any traffic reason but to look in the vehicle 
because he had a hunch there may be contraband 
tobacco. The trial judge found the stopping of the 
vehicle to be arbitrary and a breach of s.9 of the 
Charter, which could not be saved by s.1. As a 
consequence, the evidence was excluded and the 
accused were acquitted. On appeal to the New 
Brunswick Court of Appeal, Justices Turnbull and Hoyt 
held that the New Brunswick Motor Vehicle Act only 
permitted the police to arbitrarily detain motorists for 
licence and registration checks as well as mechanical 
fitness and safety inspections. There was no power 
under the legislation to stop motorists to check for 
contraband.  Justice Angers on the other hand, was not 





The following key points can be relied upon to assist 
the police in their operational duties: 
 
1. Where the police set up a check-stop program 
aimed at highway traffic safety such as impaired 
driving, the detention of a motorist is arbitrary 
but saved by s.1 of the Charter; 
 
2. Where the police have the statutory authority to 
randomly stop motorists under their provincial 
motor vehicle legislation (eg. British Columbia and 
Ontario), the stop is arbitrary but also saved by 
s.1; 
 
3. If the police do not put their mind to a highway 
traffic concern when randomly stopping motorists, 
but instead have an investigative purpose unrelated 
to traffic safety, the arbitrary detention is not 
saved by s.1; 
 
4. Where the police have an articulable cause (a 
lesser but included standard of reasonable 
grounds) to stop a motorist, the detention is not 
arbitrary and consequently not a s.9 violation; 
 
5.  Where the police arbitrarily stop a vehicle for 
highway safety and continue to detain the 
occupants for reasons neither related to the 
original purpose nor based on an articulable cause 
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 of other unlawful activity, the extension of the 
detention becomes an unsaved constitutional 
violation. In other words, once the highway traffic 
concerns are addressed, without further 
justification for detaining the person the arbitrary 
detention is no longer cleansed by s.1.  
 
6. In Saskatchewan at least, a dual or multi purpose 
traffic stop that has as one of its purposes non 
traffic related crime control, is unconstitutional. 
However, in other provinces it appears as long as 
the officer puts their mind to highway traffic 
concerns and does not exceed the legitimate 
scope of the stop (such as searching for 
contraband or asking questions unrelated to 
driving offences) other legitimate police purposes 
beyond highway safety will not render the entire 
stop unlawful. Conversely, illicit police motives, 
such as targeting only persons of colour or only 
female drivers, will transform an otherwise lawful 
traffic stop into an improper detention regardless 
of legitimate highway safety concerns factoring 
into the decision. Finally, using highway safety as 
a pretext, when it was not considered at all by the 
officer, will poison the legitimacy of the stop and 
violate the s.9 rights of the motorist.   
 
 
The impact of the Ladouceur judgment on the rest of 
Canada has yet to be determined. One can imagine that 
it will not be long before this issue goes before the 




Sgt. Mike Novakowski 
 






• Determining if the accused is unlawfully at large; 
• Determining if the accused has outstanding charges; 
• Assisting in the apprehension of the accused if they 
should fail to appear; 
• Identifying prisoners with suicidal tendencies, sex 
offenders, career criminals, and persons with a 
history of escape so they can be segregated or 
monitored as may be appropriate; 
• Assist the crown in determining the punishment it 
should seek by revealing whether the accused is a 
first time offender or otherwise; or 
• Provide advantages to an innocent accused  
- by establishing that another has in fact committed 
the crime, or 
- by ensuring the innocent will not be wrongly 
identified with someone else's criminal history. 
 
Photography, like fingerprinting, 
serves a very useful purpose in 
identifying persons responsible 




• A photographic line-up in which a witness is provided 
the opportunity of selecting and identifying a 
suspect; 
• Refreshing a person's memory of the appearance of 
an accused person; 
• For release to the public in an effort to  
- apprehend a wanted person 
 - notify the public of a dangerous offender; 
• Recording distinguishing features which would assist 
identification such as tattoos, marks, or scars; or 
• Providing advantages to the innocent person by 
eliminating them as a suspect. 
 
Identification of Criminals Act 
V
Aserve a wide variety of purposes in the 
criminal justice system. Fingerprinting 




 Linking the accused to the crime where latent prints 
are found at the scene or on other physical 
evidence; 
 Determining if the accused has been charged with 
or convicted of other crimes in order to decide if 
- the accused should be released pending trial, or 
- the accused should be proceeded against by way of 
summary conviction or indictment; 
                                                                                                
 See R. v. Beare and Higgins, (1988) 55 D.L.R. (4th) 481 (S.C.C.). 
 
The Identification of Criminals 
Act (ICA) is a federal statute 
providing police with the authority 
to photograph and fingerprint 
persons as long as the necessary 
requirements of the Act are 
satisfied.  Following a constitutional challenge2, 
mandatory fingerprinting under the Act of a person 
charged but not yet convicted has been held not to 
violate a person’s rights under s.7, 8, 9, 10, or 11(d) of 
the Charter. Section 2(1) ICA authorizes fingerprinting 
and photographing of accused persons in narrowly 




2 See R. v. Beare and Higgins, (1988) 55 D.L.R. (4th) 481 (S.C.C.). 
 defined circumstances.  If properly obtained, the police 
may then use the photograph taken, such as in a photo 
line-up, to assist in an investigation3. 
 
Section 2(1) ICA authorizes the non-consensual taking of 
fingerprints and photographs in the following 
circumstances: 
 
• any person who is in lawful custody charged with an 
indictable offence4,   
• any person who is in lawful custody convicted of an 
indictable offence5, 
• any person who is in lawful custody charged with an 
offence under the Official Secrets Act, 
• any person in lawful custody convicted of an offence 
under the Official Secrets Act, 
• any person who has been apprehended under the 
Extradition Act, or 
• any person alleged to have committed an indictable 
offence6 who is required to appear for 
fingerprinting and photographing by 
- an appearance notice, 
 - promise to appear, 
 
 - recognizance, or 
 - summons. 
 
 
  "lawful custody" means the 
person's loss of physical 
liberty must be legally 
authorized. This custodial 
detention may result from a 
valid arrest, or a continued 
detention under conviction (warrant of committal) or 
remand. If the custodial detention is not lawful it could 
not be said the person was in lawful custody. 
 
"charged" has been interpreted by the courts to have 
different meanings. There is no doubt that a person is 
charged when an information is sworn against the person 
accusing them of committing a criminal offence7. 
Although this does appear to be the popular view, some 
courts have adopted a more broad meaning of "charge" 
for the purposes of the ICA to include the interaction 
between the arresting officer and the arrestee during 
the "usual and reasonable practices of peace officers 
when they arrest and book persons suspected of 
crimes8" prior to the swearing of an information. The 
former approach should be adopted as this appears to be 
the majority opinion. In circumstances where a person is 
arrested on an outstanding arrest warrant for an 
indictable offence and fingerprints and photographs are 
required, the person could be subject to the ICA 
processes because a criminal warrant issued by the court 
requires the laying of an information. 
                                                 
                                                
3 R. v. Tam (1995) 100 C.C.C. (3d) 196 (B.C.C.A.) at p. 209. 
4 Does not include offences designated a contravention under the Contraventions 
Act where the Attorney General has made an election to proceed by information as 
if a ticket were issued. 
5 See note 4. 
6 See note 4. 
7 R. v Lewis [1996} B.C.J. No.1254 (B.C.S.C.), R. v. G.M.R. [1994] N.S.J. No. 566 
(N.S.C.A.), R. v. Berthiaume (1997) 45 C.R.R. (2d) 170 (B.C.S.C.)  see also R. v. 
Connors (1998) 121 C.C.C. (3d) 358 (B.C.C.A.) per Newbury J.A. and Donald J.A. 
 
"indictable offence" means the nature of the offence 
committed must be indictable.  For the purposes of the 
ICA, the term indictable offence includes dual offences 
which may be prosecuted summarily regardless of how 
Crown elects to proceed9. Crown election for hybrid 
offences has an impact procedurally on how the charges 
will proceed, but does not change the character of the 
offence from that of an indictable offence. Therefore, 
there is no authority under the ICA to fingerprint and 
photograph a person charged with a strictly summary 
conviction offence. 
 
"convicted of" means the 
person must have been subject 
to a conviction in a court of 
competent jurisdiction for the 
offence. For example, this would 
authorize the fingerprinting and 
photographing of inmates who 
are in the lawful custody of a 
federal institution and serving their sentence of 
incarceration. 
 
"alleged to have committed" means it is not necessary 
that the person be charged (information sworn) with the 
offence but only that it is alleged the person has 
committed the offence.  
 
"required [to appear]” means the  person was released 
by the police on an Appearance Notice, Promise to 
Appear or Recognizance, or by way of Summons issued by 
a court, and is required to appear at a later time and 
date fixed by the police or Court for the purposes of 
fingerprinting and photographing. Upon attendance by 
the person, the police would be afforded the authorities 
and protections of the ICA. 
 
There is no statutory direction as to the amount of time 
(hiatus), which must be given to the person between the 
issuance of the release document and the date and time 
 
8 R. v. Gale (1997) Docket:84579-DC2 (B.C.S.C.), see also R. v. Connors (1998) 121 
C.C.C. (3d) 358 (B.C.C.A.) per Cumming J.A.  
9 R. v. Connors (1998) 121 C.C.C. (3d) 358 (B.C.C.A.) 
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 of appearance for the fingerprinting and photographing. 
Departmental policy regarding this "turn around" time 
should guide the officer in their decision.  It has been 
suggested that the issuance of an Appearance Notice, 
Promise to Appear or Recognizance directing a person to 
attend the police department within five minutes of 
release to be fingerprinted and photographed may be 
exercised for the purpose of compelling attendance10. 
However, there is no offence of failing to appear for 
fingerprinting or photographing following release unless 
a justice has confirmed the method of release11.  
 
Use of Force 
 
If the taking of fingerprints and photographs is 
authorized under the ICA, the police may demand and 
use necessary force12 in obtaining the fingerprints and 
photographs from an uncooperative person13. If an 
individual detained in custody exhibits signs that the 
taking of fingerprints will require the application of 
physical force, it should be ensured that an information 
has been laid before a justice. A properly sworn 
information will address any argument that the person 
was not "charged" with an indictable offence prior to the 
fingerprints and photographs being taken. Since the 
courts appear to be adopting the approach that a person 
is only "charged" when an information is sworn, an 
information being laid prior to the application of physical 




Use of Fingerprints and Photographs 
 
Subsection 2(3) of the Act 
allows the fingerprints and 
photographs to be published 
for law enforcement purposes. 
This could include the use of 
fingerprints for crime scene 
comparison or photographs 
released to the public for 
information on the whereabouts of wanted persons. 
  
Protection from Liability 
 
Section 3 ICA provides the police with protection from 
liability, both civil and criminal, for anything done in 
compliance with the Act. 
  
                                                 
                                                
10 See comments of Donald J.A. in R. v. Connors (1998) 121 C.C.C. (3d) 358 (B.C.C.A.) 
11 See s.145(5) of the Criminal Code 
12 See s.2(2) of the Identification of Criminals Act 
13 See R. v. G.M.R. [1994] N.S.J. No.566 (N.S.C.A.) 
Types of Fingerprints/Photographs 
 
Section 2(1) ICA provides that persons may be 
fingerprinted or photographed or subjected to such 
other measurements, processes, and operations having 
the object of identifying persons as are approved by the 
Governor in Council.  The Governor in Council has only 
sanctioned fingerprinting, palmprinting, and photography 
under the ICA Regulations.  
 
Unless the types of prints fall in the category of 
fingerprints or palmprints, the taking of other bodily 
prints would not be authorized under the Act. For 
example, the taking of footprints purportedly under the 
authority of the Act was found not to be authorized14.  
 
Photography is not limited to conventional methods, but 
includes the use of a video image capture system15. The 
ICA does not place a restriction "on 
the number or kind of photographs 
which may be taken16". Thus 
photographs are not restricted to 
the face of the person but may be 
legitimately taken of other bodily 
areas, such as tattoos, for the 




The ICA applies to young persons as defined in the 





It appears the police may have the common law authority 
to fingerprint a person. The Supreme Court of Canada in 
R. v. Beare (1988) 55 D.L.R. (4th) 481 (S.C.C.), without 
definitely deciding the issue, found the common law 
experience strongly supports the view that custodial 
fingerprinting is justifiable at common law. LaForest J. 
for a unanimous court stated: 
 
It seems to me that a person who is arrested on reasonable 
and probable grounds that he has committed a serious 
crime, or a person against whom a case for issuing a 
summons or warrant, or confirming an appearance notice 
has been made out, must expect a significant loss of 
personal privacy. He must expect that incidental to his 
 
14 See R. v. Nielsen and Stolar (1984) 16 C.C.C. (3d) 39 (Man.C.A.) leave to appeal on 
Nielsen to S.C.C. refused, Stolar reversed on other grounds (1988) 40 C.C.C. (3d) 1 
(S.C.C.) 
15 See Crawford v. William Head Penitentiary [1992] 56 F.T.R. 32 (T.D.). 
16 R. v. Myers  [2000] O.J. No.1534 (Ont.S.C.J.) 
17 See s.44 of the Young Offenders Act 
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 being taken in custody he will be subjected to observation, 
to physical measurement and the like. Fingerprinting is of 
that nature. 
 
In R. v. Feeney [1997] 2 S.C.R. 13 (S.C.C.) police had 
taken fingerprints from the accused following what the 
majority found was an unlawful arrest. As a consequence 
of the unlawful arrest, it could not be said the taking of 
the fingerprints were lawful. However, in citing Beare, 
Sopinka J. for the majority held: 
 
After he was taken to the…detachment, the appellant was 
fingerprinted. The fingerprints matched prints found on 
the deceased's refrigerator and on an empty beer can in 
the deceased's truck. R. v. Beare [1988] 2 S.C.R. 387, 
held that fingerprinting as an incident to a lawful arrest 
did not violate the Charter. In the present case, 
however, the arrest was unlawful and involved a variety of 
Charter breaches. Compelling the accused to provide 
fingerprints in the present context was, in my view, a 
violation of s. 8 of the Charter, involving as it did a 
search and seizure related to the appellant's body, about 
which, at least in the absence of a lawful arrest, there is 
clearly a high expectation of privacy. (emphasis added) 
 
Again citing Beare, in R. v. Dilling (1993) 84 C.C.C. (3d) 
325 (B.C.C.A.) leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused 88 C.C.C. 
(3d) vi (S.C.C.), Goldie J.A. for the court stated, "a 
person so arrested [where the detaining officer had 
doubts as to identification] could be fingerprinted, 
searched, photographed, items in his possession seized, 
and notes taken of marks and scars and all this without 
his consent18". In a more recent case, R. v. Connors 
(1998) 121 C.C.C. (3d) 358 (B.C.C.A.), police arrested an 
impaired driver and subjected him to the fingerprinting 
process without first having an information sworn. This 
fingerprint was then linked to a fingerprint previously 
found at the scene of a robbery. The Court was divided 
on whether the common law authorized fingerprinting 
incidental to lawful arrest. Cumming J.A. found "the 
power to fingerprint incident to arrest for an 
indictable offence has its roots in and exists at 
common law"19. Donald J.A. found it "neither necessary 
nor appropriate to declare on the facts of [the] case a 
common law power to take fingerprints incidental to 
lawful arrest". Newbury J.A. found the ICA  occupied 
the field20 in so far as summary conviction offences are 
concerned and not as augmenting any powers which 
police officers had at common law. In R. v. Myers 
[2000] O.J. No.1534 (Ont.S.C.J.), the court held that 
the police had the common law right to photograph the 
accused incidental to arrest when the photographs 
were a necessary element in proving identity of the 
perpetrator of the crime. In this case, photographs 
were taken of the accused's face and injuries to his 
upper chest depicting the condition of his body. 
                                                 
                                                
18 At p.333. 
19 See also R. v. Feeney (1999) Docket CC980028 (B.C.S.C.) per Oppal J. at para. 60. 
20 A position adopted in R. v. Nicholson (1999) Docket X049016 (B.C.S.C.) in which a 
photograph that was taken of an arrested but not yet charged person and used in a 
photo lineup was ruled inadmissible. 
 
PHOTOGRAPHS TAKEN FOR COURT 
IDENTIFICATION PURPOSES   
 
Photographs such as Polaroid photographs taken of an 
arrested person for the purpose of preserving evidence 
of identification has been held, in prescribed 
circumstances, not to be a violation of the Charter. In R. 
v. Dilling (1993) 84 C.C.C. (3d) 325 (B.C.C.A.) leave to 
appeal to S.C.C. refused 88 C.C.C. (3d) vi (S.C.C.), police 
detained the driver of a vehicle for a prostitution 
(summary conviction) related offence following the 
driver's communication with an undercover police 
officer. One of the detaining police officers took an 
unposed Polaroid flash picture of the driver without 
informing the accused the photograph was about to be 
taken. The sole purpose of the photograph was to assist 
the undercover police officer with identifying the driver. 
The photograph was later shown to the undercover 
officer shortly after the communication with the 
suspect. The accused challenged the taking of the 
photograph as a violation of s.7 (right to privacy and 
right against self-incrimination), s.821 (search and 
seizure), and s.1022 (right to counsel) of the Charter. In 
finding no constitutional violations, Goldie J.A. stated: 
 
The camera recorded what the eye of each police officer 
could see at the moment it was taken. For the purposes of 
later identification a still photograph records less than 
deliberate police scrutiny. Examples of what the camera 
could not record are demeanour and repetitious or 
involuntary body movement. A still photograph is no more 
permanent than a sketch or the officer's notes.  
 
The court found the photograph "was a means of 
refreshing the recollection of the undercover officer 
that the person answering the charge in the court-room 
was the person who communicated with her". 
 
A similar result was found in R. v. Multani, 2002 BCSC 68 
where a police officer pulled over a van for failing to 
stop at a yellow light contrary to the Motor Vehicle Act 
 
21 On this point the court found "in this circumstance, a photograph taken without 
consent of the person detained, if it is a seizure at all, is a reasonable seizure". 
22 The accused urged the court to find the right to consult counsel and to act upon 
that advice is rendered meaningless unless an accused is separately warned of the 
intention to take a photograph and is allowed to consult  counsel before that 
occurs.  
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 (MVA). Following a request by the officer, the accused 
provided the vehicle’s insurance but was unable to 
produce his driver’s licence. After obtaining the driver’s 
name, address and date of birth, the officer returned to 
his patrol car to get his Polaroid camera. The officer 
approached the accused, told the accused to look at him, 
and took a picture. The officer printed the driver’s name 
and the violation ticket number on the bottom of the 
photo. The officer testified that people who have failed 
to produce driver’s licences in the past have given false 
names and to properly identify drivers he carries a 
Polaroid camera to take a photo of the driver to keep 
with his notes. After the photograph was taken the 
officer learned the accused was a prohibited driver 
under the MVA. The photograph was not published or 
circulated. The accused was convicted at trial of 
prohibited driving and appealed to the Supreme Court of 
British Columbia arguing, among other grounds, that the 
trial judge erred in concluding the taking of the 
photograph did not violate the accused’s right to be 
secure against unreasonable search or seizure. 
 
After reviewing numerous cases concerning the taking of 
photographs, the appeal Court found that the accused 
was not charged with an indictable offence and 
therefore the ICA did not justify the taking of the 
photograph. However, in recognizing that not every 
person investigated will be charged and that “proper 
identification evidence assists in identifying the innocent 
as well as the guilty”, there was “no reason to infer from 
the [ICA], that parliament meant to abolish 
photographing of suspects as an investigative tool in 
summary conviction cases”. In finding the taking of the 
photograph reasonable, Curtis J. held, at para. 23: 
 
When [the officer] observed [the accused] at the scene it 
was his duty to identify him properly, and in the course of 
doing so to make and record accurate evidence of identity.  
 
In the course of doing so, he could make notes of his 
observations, and he could have made a sketch in his 
notes had he chosen to do so. Generally, a photograph will 
provide evidence that is more reliable than notes or 
sketches. Because traffic enforcement officers had 
frequently experienced drivers unable to produce 
driver's licences, giving false names, [the officer] and 
others had adopted a practice of taking Polaroid pictures 
which they did not publish, but kept solely for the 
purpose of their own notes. As this case does not come 
within the ambit of the Identification of Criminals Act, I 
find it to be distinguishable from the cases to which that 
Act applies. In those circumstances, I find the reasoning 
of the B.C. Court of Appeal in the R. v. Dilling case is 
applicable. There has been no unreasonable search and 
seizure, and the photograph is properly admissible. 
 
In R. v. Giang [1994] B.C.J. No. 3154 (B.C.S.C.), the 
police arrested seven persons involved in a home 
invasion style robbery. The accused were transported 
to the police department and placed in a holding cell. 
Each accused was individually removed from the holding 
cell, directed to stand against a measuring tape affixed 
to the wall, and their photograph was taken by use of a 
Polaroid camera. The accused's names and date of 
births were then recorded at the bottom of the 
photographs. One of the officers who took the 
photographs then made photocopies and distributed 
the copies to most of the other officers who had 
participated in the arrest23. During the interview of 
the complainants, the police used the photographs 
taken of the accused to explain the role of each 
accused. The accused challenged the admissibility of 
and any evidence derived from the use of the 
photographs. The Court found the photographs to be 
admissible for the following reasons: 
 
¾ photographs can be used to refresh a witness's 
memory of a past recollection recorded provided the 
record was made and verified at the time the 
witness's memory was fresh; 
 
¾ the photographs shown to the witness were not 
shown for the purpose of acquiring evidence of 
whether the accused was involved in the commission 
of the offence (ie. photo line-up), but for the 
purpose of explaining what role the accused played 
in the commission of the offence; and 
 
¾ the photographs, like a notebook is used to record 
observations, are a method of recording the details 
of the appearance of the accused at the time of 
their arrests. 
 
In summary, photographs taken by police following 
arrest only to assist in later identification is not a 
violation of any Charter rights of an accused24.  
 
It is important to note that neither the Dilling, Giang , or 
Multani decision dealt with the application of physical 
force on the person who was being photographed. Such 
procedures must be resorted to with caution. 
Photographs taken for the purpose of evidence at trial, 
for example showing the appearance of the accused at 
                                                 
23 Some of the police officers were given colour photocopies to replace the earlier  
black and white photocopies that they had been given. 
24 See R. v. Fitzsimons [1998] B.C.J. No.3160 (B.C.S.C.). 
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 the time of arrest25 may also, depending on the 




A person may consent to the taking of their fingerprints 
and/or photographs that may assist the police and which 
may ultimately provide evidence against them at their 
trial. For example, it is not uncommon for police to 
voluntarily request fingerprints from the occupants of a 
home who have been the victim of a break and enter. 
When fingerprints are obtained from a crime scene, 
these unknown prints are compared with the known 
prints (occupants) as a process of elimination. The 
remaining unknown prints are then submitted for a 
computerized search. Likewise, a person of interest or a 
suspect may provide their fingerprints or photographs 
voluntarily to the police.  
 
However, there are important rules to consider. For 
consent to be valid it must be "informed consent". The 
meaning of informed consent has a two-limb approach26. 
Firstly, the consent must be voluntary, which includes an 
awareness of the right to refuse. Consent elicited under 
threat or compulsion cannot be regarded as valid27. 
Secondly, the person consenting to the search must be 
aware of the consequences of consenting. The police 
must disclose their anticipated purpose(s)28 for the use 
of the fingerprints or photographs at the time the 
consent was given. However, "if neither the police nor 
the consenting person limit the use which may be made 
of the evidence then, as a general rule, no limitation or 
restriction should be placed on the use of that 
evidence29".  
 
PUBLIC PLACES  
 
The police may make appropriate efforts to obtain 
photographs of a person without their consent in public 
places provided no physical compulsion is involved and the 
methods employed are non-intrusive and without 





                                                 
25 See footnote 24. 
26 See R. v. Head (1994) 52 B.C.A.C. 121 (B.C.C.A.) and R. v. Kennedy 2000 BCCA 
362. 
27 See R. v. Nielsen and Stolar (1984) 16 C.C.C. (3d) 39 (Man.C.A.) per Huband J.A. 
leave to appeal on Nielsen to S.C.C. refused, Stolar reversed on other grounds 
(1988) 40 C.C.C. (3d) 1 (S.C.C.) 
28 See R. v. Arp [1998] 3 S.C.R. 339 (S.C.C.) at para. 88. 
29 See R. v. Arp [1998] 3 S.C.R. 339 (S.C.C.) at para. 87. 
30 See R. v. Shortreed (1990) 54 C.C.C. (3d) 292 (Ont.C.A.) 
FINGERPRINT WARRANT 
 
Section 487.091 of the Criminal Code provides statutory 
authority for the police to obtain bodily prints or 
impressions, including a fingerprint or handprint, from a 
person following the issuance of a warrant by a justice. 
This section requires the justice being satisfied by 
information on oath that: 
 
• there are reasonable grounds to believe a federal 
(criminal offence) has been committed; 
 
• there are reasonable grounds to believe information 
concerning the offence will be 
obtained by the print or impression; 
and 
 
• that it is in the best interests of 
the administration of justice to 
issue the warrant. 
 
CLASS 87 GRADUATES 
 
The Police Academy is pleased to 
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 Congratulations to Cst. Doug Moore a weapon, forcible confinement, and uttering a death 
(Abbotsford), who was the recipient of 
the British Columbia Association of 
Chiefs of Police Shield of Merit for best 
all around recruit performance in basic 
training. Cst. Doug Moore (Abbotsford) 
also received the Abbotsford Police Association Oliver 
Thomson Trophy for outstanding physical fitness. Cst. 
Cameron Hemphill (Vancouver) received the Vancouver 
Police Union Excellence in Academics award for best 
academic test results in all disciplines. Cst. Roger Rempel 
(New Westminster) received the British Columbia 
Federation of Police Officers Valedictorian award for 
being selected by his peers to represent his class at the 
graduation ceremony. Cst. Clayton Ennis (Delta) and Cst. 
Cameron Hemphill (Vancouver) were the recipients of 
the Abbotsford Police Recruit Marksmanship award for 
highest qualification score during Block 3 training 
(49/50). The Honourable Mr. Justice Wallace Oppal of 
the Supreme Court of British Columbia was the keynote 
speaker at the ceremony. 
 
ONGOING PRIVACY INTEREST 
IN FINGERPRINTS 
R. v. Dore,  
(2002) Docket:C29634 (OntCA) 
 
The accused was arrested and 
threat. The accused appealed his conviction to the 
Ontario Court of Appeal arguing, in part, that the 
retention of his fingerprints by the police following the 
withdrawal of the criminal charges violated his s.8 
Charter right to be secure against unreasonable search 
and seizure and that the evidence of the fingerprint 
match was inadmissible under s.24(2).  
 
Section 8 of the Charter protects a person’s 
reasonable expectation of privacy and their right to be 
left alone by the state. In assessing whether the 
continued retention in the fingerprints following the 
withdrawing of charges was unconstitutional, two 
approaches were analyzed. First, if the prints were 
lawfully taken, did the person have a continuing privacy 
interest in the prints beyond the initial seizure? And 
second, did the retention of the prints become 
unconstitutional when the precondition for their taking 
(charge) was no longer present (as a result of an 
acquittal, withdrawal of charges, permanent stay of 
proceedings)? 
 
The accused argued that he retained a privacy interest 
in the information contained in his fingerprints and, 
once the charge had been disposed of in his favour, he 
regained the same privacy interest as a person who had 
never been charged. On the other hand, the Crown 
submitted that once the prints had been lawfully taken, 
the accused no longer had a reasonable expectation of charged with two Criminal Code 
offences and the provincial offence 
of driving without insurance arising 
from an incident involving a stolen 
license validation sticker. As a consequence, the 
accused was fingerprinted and photographed pursuant 
to s.2(1) of the Identification of Criminals Act on the 
two Criminal Code offences. All three charges were 
subsequently withdrawn and the accused pled guilty to 
two provincial offences (driving without insurance and 
use of unauthorized validation sticker) on a new 
information. The fingerprints arising from the 
withdrawn charges were not destroyed and were 
retained in a police databank. 
 
Several months later, a 17-year-old female victim 
reported she had been sexually assaulted in the 
stairwell of her apartment building. Police located 
three fingerprints on the railing where the victim said 
the assault occurred, which were matched to the 
accused’s prints through AFIS (Automated Fingerprint 
Identification System). At trial, the accused was 
convicted of sexual assault with a weapon, assault with 
privacy or, at the most, a very minimal expectation. The 
Ontario Court of Appeal noted two aspects surrounding 
a “seizure” of fingerprints: 
 
1. physical: “the actual physical act of taking the 
impression of the fingers, including the physical 
and psychological indignity involved in the process”; 
and 
 
2. informational: “the acquisition by the state of the 
informational component of the fingerprint, its 
unique characteristics and identifying relationship 
to the particular individual”.  
 
When fingerprints are lawfully taken, retention and use 
of the informational component continues as long as the 
charge remains outstanding or a conviction has been 
registered. On the other hand, a person who was 
fingerprinted on arrest and had the charges disposed 
of in their favour will have the same expectation of 
privacy as a person who had never been charged. 
However, the ongoing retention of fingerprints does 
not automatically become unconstitutional when charges 
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 are disposed of in the accused’s favour. The person’s 
right to be left alone by the state will only be 
triggered if and only when they ask for their prints to 
be returned or destroyed unless the police can 
demonstrate in special circumstances why further 
retention outweighs the persons privacy interest. 
Moreover, there is no constitutional duty on the police 
to advise the person that they may apply to have their 
prints destroyed, although it would be helpful and 
appropriate. The accused is in the best position to know 
of the outcome of the charges and can access this 
information through their counsel. Furthermore, a 
person who already has their fingerprints retained and 
stored as a result of other convictions or outstanding 
charges cannot claim a reasonable expectation of 
privacy since there would be “no constitutional 
significance” in their retention following a favourable 
disposition on another charge.  
 
In this case, because the accused did not request the 
destruction of his fingerprints, their retention did not 
violate s.8 of the Charter. Thus, the evidence was 
admissible.  
 
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca 
 
CONFRONTING SUSPECT  
WITH EVIDENCE: FUNCTIONAL 
EQUIVALENT OF AN 
INTERROGATION 
R. v. McKenzie, 
(2002) Docket: C33215 (OntCA) 
 
Following the arrest of the accused 
statement the accused informed the officers that he 
wanted to speak to his lawyer.  
 
An undercover officer to whom the accused had earlier 
confessed was brought into the room and advised the 
accused he was a police officer, told him to take care 
of himself, and left. A detective then played a portion 
of the taped conversation between the accused and the 
undercover officer where he admitted killing the 
victim. After listening for 6 minutes, the accused got 
up and asked to be taken back to cells. He was told to 
sit down and while the detectives were completing their 
notes he stated he had “sunk himself” and “might as 
well start doing [his] 25 now”. The accused was taken 
from the interview room and while in the elevator 
enroute to cells stated, “I’ll be 59”, which was taken to 
mean he would be 59 years old before being released 
from jail. Later in the cell area he said, “He got me 
drunk, he got me totalled” and “at least I can enjoy a 
good sleep now”.  
 
At trial, the accused unsuccessfully attempted to have 
the remarks at the end of the interview, in the 
elevator, and in the cell area excluded as a breach of 
his s.10(b) Charter rights. He argued that he had not 
been provided a reasonable opportunity to contact 
counsel when the police elicited these statements from 
him. The trial judge concluded that although an accused 
must have access to counsel “before he is questioned or 
otherwise required to provide evidence”, in this case 
the accused was not being questioned. The police simply 
exposed their case to him and he chose to freely make 
the statements. The accused appealed to Ontario’s top 
court.  
 
Was the Statement Elicited?  
 for murder and the advising of his 
right to counsel, he told the 
investigating police detectives he 
wanted to contact a local criminal 
lawyer. He was transported to the police station and 20 
minutes later he was taken to an interview room, 
equipped with video recording equipment, where he 
stated, “I want my lawyer”. He was told to sit down and 
identify himself and explained the interview was being 
audio and video recorded and again was informed of his 
right to counsel. The accused again asked for his lawyer 
and was escorted to a phone where he left a message 
after being unsuccessful in speaking to him. He was 
taken back to the interview room, cautioned regarding 
statements, and he advised the police that he had 
nothing to say. When asked if he wanted to make a 
The right to counsel places a duty on the police to 
cease questioning or otherwise attempting to elicit 
evidence from a detainee who asserts their right to 
counsel until they have been afforded a reasonable 
opportunity to consult with a lawyer. The right is more 
than simply being afforded an opportunity to place a 
telephone call but requires speaking with a lawyer or at 
minimum, being given a reasonable opportunity to do so. 
Although the accused was allowed to use a phone, he 
did not speak to a lawyer nor was he given a reasonable 
opportunity to do so before being confronted with the 
taped confession. Even though no direct questions were 
posed to him, the conduct of the police amounted to 
the “functional equivalent of an interrogation”. 
Furthermore, since the accused did not speak to a 
lawyer and obtain advice about his rights and various 
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 police conduct he should be cautious of, the police were 
able to manipulate him into a mental state in which he 
was more likely to talk.  In summary, there was a causal 
link between the police conduct and the making of the 
statements such that they were “elicited” and since the 
accused was not provided a reasonable opportunity to 
consult counsel, his s.10(b) Charter right had been 
violated. Since the statements were conscriptive and 
their admission would render the trial unfair, they were 
excluded under s.24(2) of the Charter. Not satisfied 
that a jury would necessarily convict had the impugned 
statements been excluded despite there being a very 
strong case against the accused, the Ontario Court of 
Appeal quashed the conviction and ordered a new trial.  
 
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca 
 
Note-able Quote 
“For the police, justice and equality are ideally 
inseparable.  Thus, they must act impartially in terms 
of the decision to make an arrest and in terms of the 
ensuing treatment given an individual during the arrest 
process.  Beyond the legal and philosophical basis for 
equality is the professional ethic which calls for 
universality of treatment31”. James W. Sterling 
 
WEAPONS WARRANT SEARCH 
UNCONSTITUTIONAL 
R. v. Hurrell,  
(2002) Coket:C36968 (OntCA) 
 
The police applied for and were 
been or is being committed, but a preventative search 
authority designed to prevent serious injury and death 
from the use of firearms and other dangerous objects. 
As a result, the police entered the accused’s home and 
seized 12 firearms, 2 cross bows, 11 containers of 
ammunition, and his firearms acquisition certificate. 
Under s.111(1) of the Code, the police made an 
application for an order prohibiting the accused from 
possessing firearms and other specified items. The 
accused made an unsuccessful application to the 
Ontario Superior Court of Justice seeking a declaration 
that s.117.04(1) was unconstitutional and could not be 
saved by s.1 of the Charter. Further, the accused 
sought an order quashing the warrant and the return of 
all the seized items. The accused appealed to the 
Ontario Court of Appeal arguing, among other grounds, 
that the section does not require that the justice be 
satisfied there are reasonable grounds to believe the 




Moldover J.A., for a unanimous Ontario Court of 
Appeal, found that s. 117.04(1) does not require that 
the police officer seeking the warrant have reasonable 
grounds to believe that weapons or other items sought 
are likely to be found on the person or premises to be 
searched. Although the officer requires reasonable 
grounds to believe it is “not desirable” (or “not 
advisable”, which “envisages an identifiable threat of 
serious or significant harm likely to be caused by 
firearms or other dangerous objects to the safety of 
specified individuals”), in the interests of public safety granted a search warrant under 
s.117.04(1) of the Criminal Code 
which reads as follows 
 
s.117.04(1) Criminal Code 
Where, pursuant to an application made by a peace officer 
with respect to any person, a justice is satisfied that there 
are reasonable grounds to believe that it is not desirable in 
the interests of the safety of the person, or of any other 
person, for the person to possess any weapon, prohibited 
device, ammunition, prohibited ammunition or explosive 
substance, the justice may issue a warrant authorizing a peace 
officer to search for and seize any such thing, and any 
authorization, licence or registration certificate relating to 
any such thing, that is held by or in the possession of the 
person. 
 
This section is not an offence based provision involving 
the search for evidence to prove that an offence has 
                                                 
31 (1972) Change in Role Concepts of Police Officers; Professional Standards 
Division of the International Association of Chiefs of Police.  
for a person to possess the weapon, it does not require 
reasonable grounds to believe the person possesses 
such a weapon. This deficiency makes the section 
incurably overly broad and permits the police to 
undergo fishing expeditions by invading a person’s 
privacy when they have no reason to believe or suspect 
that the person has weapons in their possession. To 
this end the provision is unconstitutional and cannot be 
saved by s.1 of the Charter.  
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In finding that s.117.04(1) was in need of a 
“constitutional overhaul”, the Court of Appeal 
suspended its’ declaration of invalidity for six months 
to give Parliament the opportunity to amend the 
legislation in compliance with the Charter. In the 
meanwhile, any warrants issued within the six-month 
exemption period should be in compliance with the 
Attorney General’s draft legislation presented during 
argument, which read as follows: 
 
 s.117.04(1) Criminal Code: Attorney General’s Draft Legislation 
Where, pursuant to an application made by a peace officer 
with respect to any person, a justice is satisfied by 
information on oath that there are reasonable grounds to 
believe that the person possesses a weapon, prohibited device, 
ammunition, prohibited ammunition or explosive device in a 
building, receptacle or place, and that it is not desirable in the 
interests of the safety of the person, or of any other person, 
for the person to possess the weapon, prohibited device, 
ammunition, prohibited ammunition or explosive substance, the 
justice may issue a warrant authorizing a peace officer to 
search the building, receptacle or place and seize any such 
thing, and any authorization, licence or registration certificate 
relating to any such thing, that is held by or in the possession 
of the person. 
 
The Court also quashed the warrant and ordered the 
return of the items seized from the accused’s home. 
Once the items were returned, the Court suggested 
that the police may make a demand under s.117.03(1) of 
the Code requiring the accused produce the necessary 
documents for inspection and seize any items illegally 
possessed or seek a fresh warrant under the re-
worded s.117.04(1).   
 
Editor’s Comments: The warrantless search provisions 
of s.117.04(2) of the Code are inextricably  linked to 
s.117.04(1). For the police to search and seize without a 
warrant under s.117.04(2), the pre-conditions of 
s.117.04(1) must be satisfied and warrant 
impracticability (exigent circumstances) must exist. 
Thus, the proposed wording must also be read in 
conjunction with s.117.04(2) if an officer utilizes the 
warrantless search provision. 
 
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca 
 
INVESTIGATIVE NECESSITY: 
LAST RESORT REQUIREMENT? 
R. v. Holtam, 2002 BCCA 339 
 









forced entry or burglary were detected and since the 
premise was in darkness, it could be inferred that the 
attacker was familiar with the layout of the home. The 
accused, who was the husband and father of the 
deceased, was not at home and the only member of the 
family not yet accounted for.  
 
The police subsequently learned from a neighbour that 
the accused’s vehicle had been parked at the house 
about 7 am, which was unusual because he usually left 
for work at an earlier time (6:30 am).  An officer called 
the accused at his workplace and, pretending that he 
was investigating a driving complaint, was told by the 
accused that he left home at about 6:30 am. The police 
attended the accused’s workplace, arrested him, and 
seized his clothing and letters found in his wallet from 
a woman indicating he was having an affair. The accused 
was released shortly thereafter, as the police did not 
think they had sufficient evidence to lay a charge.  
 
Later, as a result of an undercover operation, the police 
surreptitiously audio and video recorded a conversation 
at a hotel room where the accused confessed to the 
murders. A DNA examination of the accused’s clothing 
found blood traces from the children on his shirt and 
shoe seized at the time of his arrest. Blood splatter 
patterns on the accused’s shirt were also consistent 
with the downward swinging of a weapon. The accused 
was convicted by a jury of two first degree murder 
counts and one count of attempted murder. The 
accused appealed to the British Columbia Court of 
Appeal arguing, in part, that the trial judge erred in 
admitting the items seized from the accused at the 
time of his initial arrest as well as the taped 
conversation.  
 
Reasonable Grounds and the Seizure 
 
The accused submitted that the police did not have 
reasonable grounds to arrest him, thus the seizure of 
the clothing and letters were not proper as an incident 
to arrest. During the trial, the court concluded the 
V
Aafter a neighbour, who had gone to 
check on the occupants, found the 
premises in darkness, the front door 
unlocked, and the resident mother 
nd her young 6-year-old daughter seriously injured 
nside the house. The responding officers located the 
aughter in the living room area and the mother in a 
ed in a nearby room, both grievously wounded and 
ater pronounced dead. During a further search of the 
ome, an officer discovered an 8-year-old boy with 
erious head wounds in a semi-conscious condition in 
he stairwell going up to his bedroom. No signs of 
officer had reasonable grounds, subjectively held and 
objectively supportable, to make the arrest. Although 
the statement made to the officer over the telephone 
about the time he left the residence (which provided a 
time discrepancy as to the accused’s departure) was 
ruled inadmissible, the circumstances surrounding the 
discovery of a “fresh” scene where a brutal and serious 
crime took place at a residence where the police knew 
the accused lived and from which the accused was 
absent were sufficient to meet the reasonable belief 
standard. The proper test for reasonable grounds is 
olume 2 Issue 8 
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 whether “a reasonable person placed in the position of 
the officer [is] able to conclude that there were indeed 
reasonable…grounds for the arrest”. Hall J.A., for the 
unanimous appeal court, found the trial judge applied 
the proper test. Since the arrest was lawful, “the 
police were entitled to seize the items they did from 
the [accused] at the time of his arrest including the 
clothing, which later furnished DNA evidence and the 
letters…, which were relied upon by the Crown as 
disclosing a motive for the crimes”. As the police were 
“acting legitimately in seeking to discover possible 
evidence linking the [accused] to the crimes”, they 
were properly searching within the scope permissible as 
an incident to lawful arrest.  
 
The Taped Conversation 
 
The accused challenged the admissibility of the 
intercepted conversation between him and the 
undercover officer, surreptitiously recorded at the 
hotel room under judicial authorization, by contending 
that the requirement of investigative necessity was not 
properly demonstrated as required by s.186(1)(b) of 
the Criminal Code. Although the trial judge had 
concerns about the lack of progress in the 
investigation, such as the delay in submitting the 
exhibits for DNA testing, he nonetheless concluded 
that the police “do not have to exhaust all other forms 
of investigations before embarking upon an application” 
and ruled the conversation admissible. In upholding the 
trial judge’s decision, Hall J.A. found that 
“investigative necessity” test is not investigative “last 
resort”, but rather a “no other reasonable alternative 
method of investigation”32 enquiry.  
 
In this case, at the time of the intercept application 
neither the accused nor his mistress were going to 
cooperate with the police and even if they had the DNA 
evidence on the accused’s clothes prior to the 
intercept, there may be other reasons why it would be 
there since the crime occurred in a family setting. 
Moreover, the police were concurrently relying on 
warrants issued under ss.487.01 (general warrant) and 
184.2 (one party consent) of the Code, which also 
provided a proper basis for the admission of the 
evidence.  The accused’s appeal was dismissed and the 
conviction upheld. 
 
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca 
 
                                                 
32 The Court adopted the test from R. v. Araujo, (1998) 127 S.C.C. (3d) 315 (S.C.C.) 
WARRANTLESS ENTRY TO 
PROTECT LIFE REASONABLE 
R. v. Jamieson, 2002 BCCA 411 
 
A municipal police agency responded 
Volume 2 Issue 8 
August 2002 to a 911 call of a man running from a 
house suffering from grievous acid 
burns to his face and body. The 
police, who were familiar with the 
victim, had information that suggested there may be 
dangerous chemicals from a clandestine drug lab inside 
the house. He had ordered and picked up chemicals 
consistent with the manufacture of amphetamines in 
the months prior and had been twice found in 
possession of items the police suspected were related 
to the manufacture of drugs. The police also had 
information that the victim had acid thrown at him 
while inside the house. Further, the police received 
information that a distraught young woman also came 
from the home and was repeatedly asking if the police 
found “Jessica”. The police placed a call to the 
residence but there was no answer from inside, no 
movement was heard or seen, and no one answered the 
door after repeated knocking.  
 
The municipal police contacted the RCMP, whom they 
relied upon for expertise in situations involving the 
investigation and dismantling of clandestine drug labs. 
Three officers entered the home without a warrant 2 ½ 
hours after the 911 call to look for suspects and/or 
victims, injured or dead. They were only in the premises 
for 10 to 15 minutes, opening doors and windows but 
had an opportunity to observe equipment used in the 
manufacture of drugs. Because the officers had not 
checked whether the heating and cooling apparatuses 
were operational, an officer re-entered to ensure the 
lab was not cooking. The following day, the police 
obtained a search warrant in connection with the 




The trial judge concluded that the police had 
reasonable grounds to believe that other persons might 
be in the residence and had a duty to ensure the 
persons inside and in the vicinity of the house were 
safe by entering it. He found that the officers’ primary 
motive for entering was to protect public safety, not to 
investigate. The police were justified in entering the 
residence because there “were exigent circumstances” 
and “the police had an obligation to act decisively and 
out of a concern for the safety of individuals who 
 might be in the home and for the safety of individuals 
in the immediate vicinity”. The accused appealed to the 




Although the accused agreed that the police entered in 
the performance of their duties, he argued that the 
police entered primarily to investigate drug offences, 
and not for the purpose of protecting the public.  He 
suggested that the time between the 911 call and police 
entry (2 ½ hours), the failure of the police to use the 
fire department for entry, and an officer’s admission 
that he did not have reasonable grounds prior to the 
entry to obtain a warrant was demonstrative of the 
investigative nature of the motive. Furthermore, the 
information the police relied upon to obtain the warrant 
was acquired during the warrantless and unreasonable 
entry and thus the warrant should be ruled invalid.  
 
In unanimously dismissing the appeal, Saunders J.A.  
for the British Columbia Court of Appeal concluded 
that the warrantless search of the home was prima 
facie unreasonable and the Crown bears the burden of 
rebutting the presumption. If the search was 
conducted for the purpose of investigating crime, the 
criteria necessary for a search warrant must be 
satisfied. In this case however, the police were acting 
in the performance of their duty to protect public 
safety and the admissibility of the evidence hinged on a 
two-stage inquiry: 
 
1. Did the police conduct fall within the general scope 
of any duty imposed by statute or recognized at 
common law? The RCMP Act, which was binding on 
the responding RCMP officers, and the Police Act, 
which was binding on the municipal officers, both 
imposed a statutory duty on the police to protect 
life. Further, under the common law the police have 
a general duty to protect life, which is not limited 
to protecting the lives of victims of crime. 
 
2. If the answer to question 1 is yes, did the police 
conduct involve an unjustifiable use of powers 
associated with the duty? In finding that the 
police were justified in entering without a warrant, 
Saunders J.A. stated:  
 
The level of danger suspected was high and was 
associated to the various rooms of the residence so 
that examination of one room only was not a viable 
response to the concern. There was no practical way to 
determine whether a lab was cooking or others were in 
the house injured other than by entering. It was known 
that one person in the house had already suffered 
grievous injuries to his face and head through contact 
with a highly caustic substance. The duty pursued was 
the protection of others. The purpose of the first 
entry was to look for “bodies” and was of limited 
duration. 
 
Notwithstanding the [accused’s] privacy interest in the 
residence, …the law permitted the police to enter the 
home, provided the entry was no more extensive than 
required to ensure safety. In this case the entry was 
of limited duration, considering the deliberation 
required to avoid chemical accident. I conclude that 
there was strong and persuasive evidence…the 
entry…was legally justified in the circumstances, and 
thus not an unreasonable search within the meaning of 
s.8 of the Charter.  
 
Not Using the Fire Department 
 
The Court found the RCMP personnel were specially 
trained to deal with clandestine labs and associated 
dangerous materials and persons entering the premises 




Although an excessive delay could support the view 
that entry was made for an investigative purpose, the 
delay was reasonably explained by the time required 
for the specially trained officers to be contacted at 
their home, travel to their work place to obtain the 
necessary protective equipment, travel to the accused’s 
home, and gear up. This was all done to enter a 
suspected chemical laboratory where one person had 
already been seriously injured by a caustic substance. 
 
Absence of a Warrant 
 
Even though the police may have had time to obtain a 
telewarrant, it is an investigative tool directed towards 
the crime prevention aspect of police duties and 
requires reasonable grounds. However, the duty of the 
police to protect life and property does not depend 
upon establishing reasonable grounds to obtain a search 
warrant. The accused’s appeal was dismissed. 
 




“…I have seen competent leaders who stood in front of 
a platoon and all they saw was the platoon. But great 
leaders stand in front of a platoon and see 44 
individuals, each of whom has aspirations, each of whom 
wants to live, each of whom wants to do good”. General  
H. Norman Schwarzkopf 
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 POLICE PROACTIVENESS & 
DETAINEE DILIGENCE 
R. v. Anane, 
(2002) Court File No. 183/01 (OntSCJ) 
 
The accused failed a roadside 










































accused lost interest in contacting a lawyer. Although 
the police could have done more to help the accused, he 
himself should have been “a bit more proactive”. The 
accused appealed to the Ontario Superior Court of 
Justice. Dambrot J. agreed with the trial judge that 
the police should have asked the accused if he wanted 
to use a telephone book or other assistance before 
immediately offering duty counsel: 
V
Afound him trying to change the flat 
tire of his vehicle. The accused 
admitted being the driver, was 
aving difficulty changing the tire, and the officer 
etected a strong smell of liquor on his breath. The 
fficer then read the accused his right to counsel. The 
ccused acknowledged he understood but did not 
espond as to whether he wished to call a lawyer. The 
ccused was then transported to the police detachment 
here he was asked to read a notice of the right to 
ounsel posted on the wall of the cell area. He again 
cknowledged that he understood his rights but when 
sked if he wished to contact counsel, he responded “I 
on’t know the number to my lawyer”. When offered 
egal aid duty counsel, the accused stated he did not 
ish to speak to duty counsel “right now”. The accused 
as told he would be released that day if there was 
nothing else”. Prior to the breath samples, the 
ntoxilyzer technician also advised the accused of his 
ight to counsel and asked him if he wished to contact a 
awyer. The accused replied “no” and when asked if he 
as sure replied, “Yes, I don’t want a lawyer”. The 
ccused subsequently provided two breath samples of 
44mg% and 143mg% respectively. 
he accused argued that his right to counsel under 
.10(b) of the Charter had been violated. He testified 
hat when he stated he did not know his lawyer’s 
umber he did want to speak to him. However, he did 
ot name his lawyer or ask for a telephone book 
ecause the officer didn’t give him the opportunity 
hen he immediately offered duty counsel. 
urthermore, when the technician offered him the 
hance to speak with a lawyer he thought, as a result of 
is contact with the investigating officer, that he did 
ot have the option because nothing had been done for 
im to get in contact with his lawyer when he said he 
id not know his lawyer’s number.  
 
n convicting the accused of care and control over 
0mg%, the trial judge found that the accused’s s.10(b) 
ight had not been violated and that the accused’s 
rimary concern was being released. Once he knew he 
as likely to be released, the trial judge found the 
 
It is beyond dispute that a police officer who arrests an 
accused must comply with both the informational and the 
implementational components of the right to counsel 
guaranteed by s. 10(b) of the Charter. When an accused 
requests the assistance of counsel, it is incumbent on the 
police officer, as part of the obligation to comply with 
the implementational component of s. 10(b), to facilitate 
contact with counsel…Where a request is made to contact 
counsel, the police are obliged to provide the means for 
doing so. They must provide access to a telephone, in 
conditions of privacy, and a telephone book, or other 
similar assistance, where necessary…(references omitted) 
 
If the accused had provided breath samples at this 
point, his s.10(b) right would have been violated. 
However, the officer held off questioning or taking 
samples (not out of respect for the accused’s rights -- 
but done nonetheless) and presented the accused to 
the intoxilyzer technician who again advised him of his 
right to counsel. The accused did not want to speak to a 
lawyer and did not ask for assistance in obtaining the 
number. The technician cured the investigating 
officer’s error and the accused was not diligent in 
exercising his rights, which suspended the police 
obligation to hold off and facilitate counsel. In this 
case, “police proactiveness and detainee diligence” 
weighed out equally and there was no violation of the 
accused’s s.10(b) Charter right. The appeal was 
dismissed. 
 
LEGAL LAUGHS  
 
The day after his client was found 
guilty, lawyer Thompson rushed into 
court jubilantly waving a thick sheaf 
of papers. “Your Honour, Your 
Honour,” he cried. “I’ve just uncovered 
new evidence that requires reopening my client’s case.” 
The judge stared at the lawyer. “New evidence?” the 
judge inquired. “What sort of evidence?” “My client has 
an extra $10,000, and I only found out about it 
today!”33  
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33 Source: Behrman, Sid. (1991). The Lawyer Joke Book. Dorset Press: New York, 
NY. 
 ROADSIDE TEST USED TO 
CONFIRM, RATHER THAN 
FORM, OFFICER’s BELIEF 
R. v. Bennett, 2002 ABQB 625 
 









































police officer has reasonable and probable grounds to 
believe that a person has committed an offence under 
s.253 of the Code (impaired driving/over 80mg%). 
Reasonable grounds under this section requires “that 
the police officer subjectively have an honest belief 
that the suspect committed the offence” and, 
objectively, there must exist reasonable grounds for 
this belief.  Furthermore, the “existence of reasonable 
V
Aafter he was observed drive into a 
parking lot at an excessive speed, 
make a sudden, wide irregular u-
turn, and park in front of a grocery 
tore. Upon exiting his vehicle, the accused immediately 
elinquished his car keys to the officer. After 
urrendering his driver’s licence, credit card, and 
ostco card to the officer, the accused was convinced 
e had misplaced his licence. The officer noted an 
dour of liquor on the accused’s breath, slurred speech, 
nd bloodshot eyes. After reading the roadside 
creening demand, the accused provided a sample of his 
reath and failed. This confirmed the officer’s opinion 
hat the accused was impaired and also indicated that 
he accused’s BAC was at least 100mg%. A subsequent 
ntoxilyzer test resulted in two samples being taken 
hich exceeded the legal limit.  
t trial, the accused was acquitted of both impaired 
riving and over 80mg%. Although he did not make any 
otes, the officer testified his standard procedure was 
o allow a 20 minute time lapse if he had reason to 
elieve that a driver had recently consumed alcohol. He 
estified that by administering the test he therefore 
ad no reason to be concerned. The accused testified 
hat he had been drinking two minutes before his 
ncounter with the police, which resulted in an 
nreliable roadside fail reading. Thus, the officer 
acked reasonable and probable grounds to give the 
reath demand. As a consequence, the breath demand 
iolated the accused’s rights under s.8 of the Charter 
nd the Certificate of Analysis was excluded under 
.24(2). The Crown appealed to the Alberta Court of 
ueen’s Bench arguing that the trial judge applied the 
rong test in determining whether there was a breach 
f the accused’s s.8 rights. 
easonable Grounds 
ection 8 of the Charter protects a person from 
nreasonable search or seizure, which includes the 
aking of breath samples pursuant to the demand of a 
olice officer. However, s.254(3) of the Criminal Code 
ermits the lawful taking of breath samples where the 
and probable grounds must be based upon facts known 
by or available to the peace officer at the time [they] 
formed the requisite belief”. The assessment is not one 
of approaching the evidence in “a piecemeal fashion” or 
by testing “individual pieces of evidence that support 
the presence of reasonable grounds”, but by answering 
the question, “does the totality of the evidence 
available to the peace officer at the time [they] 
formed the belief support an objective finding that 
[they] had reasonable and probable grounds to believe 
the ability of the driver was impaired by alcohol”. 
 
In this case, there was no evidence that the roadside 
test was inaccurate or unreliable. The trial judge did 
not take issue with the credibility of the officer but 
second-guessed his testimony concerning reasonable 
grounds and speculated that the roadside test was 
unreliable. Alberta Court of Queen’s bench Justice 
Kenny held that “there is no legislated or common law 
duty on the officer to inquire when the driver last 
consumed alcohol” unless there was evidence that would 
indicate this to be the case. The trial judge solely 
focused his doubt on the reliability of the test without 
considering the whole of the evidence; this was an 
error in law. Even apart from the roadside test, there 
existed substantial evidence of impairment that would 
support subjective reasonable and probable grounds 
while objectively, a reasonable person placed in the 
position of the officer would be able to conclude that 
reasonable and probable grounds existed. The 
“roadside test merely confirmed, rather than formed”, 
the officer’s belief.  
 
Since reasonable and probable grounds existed for the 
demand, the accused’s rights under s.8 were not 
violated. The acquittal was set aside and a new trial was 
ordered. 
 




“If you don’t stand for something, you’ll fall for 
anything”. Don Shula 
olume 2 Issue 8 
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 CONTINUED IMPAIRED ARREST 
ARBITARY: CHARGES STAYED 
R. v. Paquette, 2002 SKPC 18 
 






























CAT LEADS COPS TO  
GROW-OP 
R. v. Erickson, 2002 BCSC 785 
 
The accused was arrested for 
V
Ato confirm whether he was wearing a 
seatbelt and formed the opinion the 
accused was impaired. The accused 
admitted to having a “few drinks” 
nd the officer noted a smell of liquor on the accused’s 
reath, that his eyes were glossy, and that his speech 
as slurred. The accused subsequently provided two 
reath samples of 170mg% and 160mg%. Fifteen 
inutes after the breathalyser tests the accused was 
odged in cells. Although he did not recall what 
ondition the accused was in, the senior officer on duty 
who was also the breathalyser technician) testified he 
etained the accused because of the readings and that 
e, and the only other officer on duty at the time, had 
o resume patrol duties and could not drive the accused 
ome, nor could they wait for someone to pick him up. 
he documents were left for another officer to serve 
nd about 10 hours later the accused was released.  
t trial, the accused argued that he had been 
rbitrarily detained contrary to s.9 of the Charter. 
lthough the trial judge found the initial arrest and 
etention of the accused for the purpose of breath 
amples lawful under the Criminal Code (“to “secure and 
reserve evidence of or relating to the offence”, i.e. to 
onduct breathalyser tests”), he agreed the continued 
etention after the tests was arbitrary. Goliath J. of 
he Saskatchewan Provincial Court concluded: 
I find that the continued detention of the accused after 
the completion of the breath tests was not justified 
under Section 498 of the Criminal Code. I am of the view 
that where such detention is not justified or authorized 
it may in some circumstances, but not in every case, be 
“arbitrary” within the meaning of Section 9 of The 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. I find that in 
this case the detention of the accused beyond the time it 
would have taken to complete the breath tests and the 
unusual documentation and service, or at the very latest, 
beyond the time it would have taken to return him to his 
home or to make arrangements to have him picked up, was 
arbitrary. His continued detention was for reasons of 
convenience and perhaps lack of resources, rather than 
necessity or legal justification. (emphasis in the original) 
s a result, a stay of proceedings was ordered. 
omplete case available at www.lawsociety.sk.ca 
assault causing bodily harm against 
olume 2 Issue 8 
ugust 2002 his girlfriend.  His effects, including 
his house keys, were taken from him 
and he was lodged in cells. The 
accused asked the police that his parents be allowed to 
attend his home to remove his dog and obtain clothing 
for his two children he had custody of from a previous 
marriage. The investigating officer, who was 
considering obtaining a warrant and concerned that the 
parents might remove potential evidence of the assault, 
explained that they would arrange his request provided 
the police could accompany his parents into the home. A 
second officer, who knew nothing of the details of the 
assault investigation, was requested to accompany the 
parents and to ensure only children’s clothing and the 
dog were removed. The officer was also told to keep 
his eyes open in case he observed anything that might 
be evidence of an assault.  
 
While in the house, a cat entered the main floor and 
the accused’s mother informed the officer that the cat 
did not belong in the house. The cat ran down the 
stairs, into the basement, and the officer gave chase 
to retrieve it. While in the basement retrieving the 
cat, the officer observed venting, electrical cords, and 
ballasts leading from a door under which light could be 
seen. Later, the accused’s mother took a bag of 
garbage from the home and placed it on the street 
along side other bags that had already been placed 
outside. The officer seized the garbage, took it to the 
police station, and found it to contain a bloody shirt and 
several marihuana seedlings.  
 
During this visit however, the dog was not taken from 
the home because the parents did not have an 
appropriate vehicle to transport it. This, along with the 
observations, was reported to the investigator of the 
assault who made arrangements for a second visit later 
that day so the dog could be removed. A tele-search 
warrant was subsequently obtained under the 
Controlled Drugs and Substances Act and evidence 
relating to a charge of unlawfully producing a controlled 
substance was seized. 
 
During the voire dire to determine the admissibility of 
evidence, the accused argued, among other grounds, 
19
 that his apparent consent to enter the residence was 
not valid and the information obtained from this entry 
could not be used to support the issuance of the search 
warrant. He contended that the condition imposed by 
the police that they would have to accompany his 
parents into the home did not give him a choice and 
that he merely acquiesced to allowing the police entry. 
In short, the accused suggested his right under s.8 of 
the Charter was violated when the police searched 
first (made observations while in the home without a 




Justice Melnick of the British Columbia Supreme Court 
held that the police acted reasonably. The accused did 
have a choice as to whether he would allow the police to 
enter. He could have told the police that he would not 
have his parents enter the home if the police were 
going to accompany them. Notwithstanding that it was 
possible for the police to have the parents go in 
unaccompanied and then search them when they 
emerged from the house, this would have been 
impractical. As for the dog, the door could have simply 
been opened and the dog called out. Although the 
accused may not have anticipated that the basement 
would be entered, the officer went into the basement 
in good faith to retrieve the cat, which was 
unconnected with “keeping his eyes open” for evidence. 
He did not use the cat  as a pretext to go down into the 
basement to search. Melnick J. stated: 
 
Although the additional purpose of [the officer] “keeping 
his eyes open” was not a legal activity by him in the 
circumstances, the discovery of what turned out to be 
evidence of the grow operation in the basement did not 
flow from that illegal activity. That is, there was no nexus 
between the two activities as he did not go down into the 
basement as part of his improper mandate to look over the 
premises for evidence relating to the assault charge, but 
rather in response to the unanticipated appearance of the 
cat and the cat going to the basement. 
 
However, had the officer taken advantage of being in 
the house and entered the basement to look for 
evidence, all of his observations would have been  
excised from the warrant and the remaining evidence 
would have been insufficient to obtain a warrant. Since 
the entry into the home and the subsequent trip into 
the basement was lawful, the warrant was properly 
issued and the evidence was admissible.  
 




LACKS SUFFICIENT GROUNDS 
R. v. Campbell, 2002 BCSC 553 
 
Two police officers patrolling a 
beach known as a hot spot, 
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where young persons frequented and 
consumed alcohol and drugs, 
observed a group of 6 to 8 young persons standing 
around a parked vehicle. A female in the group 
appeared to be drinking what the officers suspected 
was alcohol. After the officers parked their vehicle 
and approached the group to investigate, a male 
carrying a backpack began to walk away. The male had 
been standing on the same side of the car as the 
female, 15-20 feet away, but had not been observed 
having any dealings or contact with her. One of the 
officers checked the female, who was under age and 
had been drinking vodka, and served her with a ticket 
for being a minor in possession of liquor. The second 
officer stopped the male to investigate whether he was 
carrying any liquor in his backpack and asked for 
identification, which the accused failed to produce 
(although he did identify himself verbally).  
 
The officer asked to search the accused’s backpack, 
but was refused. This demand was repeated and after 
two further refusals, the accused was arrested for 
obstruction of justice. No Charter warnings were 
provided, but the accused was taken over to the police 
vehicle and the officer again demanded to search the 
backpack, which again was refused. The accused’s 
reluctance to permit the search of his backpack raised 
the suspicions of the officer that he may be carrying 
something more than alcohol. The other police officer, 
who was unaware the accused had been arrested but 
had overheard the search demand and refusal at the 
police vehicle, told the accused his bag was going to be 
searched and took it from him. At this time the 
accused volunteered that there were drugs in the bag 
and the police opened it and found marihuana, 
psilocybin, and cocaine. The accused was also searched 
and $103 found in his pants pocket was seized as 
proceeds of crime.  
 
As a result, the accused was charged with three counts 
of trafficking and one count of possession of proceeds 
of crime. During the trial voire dire to determine the 
20
 admissibility of evidence, the accused argued, among 
other grounds, that his right to be secure against 
unreasonable search and seizure was violated and the 
evidence was inadmissible under s.24(2) of the Charter.  
 
Reasonable Grounds and the Search 
 
Section 67 of British Columbia’s Liquor Control and 
Licensing Act (LCLA) permits police officers to search 
persons and places (except residences) without a 
warrant where the officer believes on reasonable and 
probable grounds that liquor is unlawfully possessed or 
possessed for an unlawful purpose. This section also 
creates an offence if a person obstructs the search. A 
lawful search under this section requires the existence 
of reasonable and probable grounds. The Crown 
submitted that, although the accused was of legal age 
to possess liquor and that there was no evidence he was 
consuming or supplying liquor to minors, the police 
nonetheless had reasonable grounds to believe he had 
committed an offence under the LCLA. The beach was a 
well known area for minors to gather and consume 
alcohol and/or drugs, the officers had personal 
experience in this regard, it was late on a summer 
weekend, backpacks were commonly used in 
transporting alcohol and/or drugs, the accused failed 
to produce identification, and the accused walked away 
from the group as the police approached. On the other 
hand, the accused argued that the objective criteria 
only amounted to a mere suspicion, insufficient to meet 
the reasonable belief standard required for a 
warrantless search.  
 
British Columbia Supreme Court Justice Smith 
concluded that the police did not have the objective 
evidence to support a belief that the accused had 
committed or was about to commit an offence under 
the LCLA. The accused, who appeared to be hanging 
around with a group of young persons, was 15-20 feet 
away from a female who had been seen drinking but had 
not been seen to have any contact or dealings with him. 
Since there were no reasonable grounds to search the 
accused, there were also insufficient grounds to arrest 
him for obstructing the search when he refused to let 
the officers look into the backpack.  
 
Although reasonable grounds developed after the 
accused informed the police that his backpack 
contained drugs, this statement was only made after 
his arrest without being given the appropriate Charter 
warnings. Because the officers knew or ought to have 
known that they did not objectively have reasonable 
grounds to search the accused, the s.8 Charter 
violation was serious. Furthermore, the obstruction 
arrest was made only to allow the police to search the 
backpack incidental to arrest and the absence of any 
Charter warnings supported the appearance that the 
officer had no intention of pursuing the charge. The 
police conduct did not demonstrate good faith nor a 
mere technical breach and the evidence was ruled 
inadmissible under s.24(2) of the Charter. 
 
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca 
 
INCORRECT ADVICE FROM 
LEGAL AID RESULTS IN 
ACQUITTAL 
R. v. Watts, 2002 BCPC 0235 
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August 2002 police officer found the accused in a 
parked motor vehicle and demanded 
he provide a sample of his breath. 
The accused accompanied the 
fficer to the police station where a call was placed to 
egal Aid. Evidently, on the advice received from the 
egal aid lawyer, the accused refused to provide a 
reath sample. The accused was charged with impaired 
riving and refusing to provide a breath sample. At 
rial, the accused was acquitted of both charges. On 
he impaired charge, British Columbia Provincial Court 
udge Angelomatis found that although the officer had 
easonable grounds for the demand, the evidence was 
nsufficient to warrant a conviction. On the refusal 
harge, the judge concluded that because the Legal Aid 
awyer is appointed by the state, if they provide 
ncorrect legal advice (misinformation or 
isinformation) the person who receives that advice is 
ot criminally responsible. On the other hand, a person 
ho pays for a lawyer themselves would not gain an 
dvantage from this mistake. Interestingly, the judge 
ollowed a number of Ontario cases on this point even 
hough he disagreed with them personally, had a 
roblem with them professionally, found them 
npalatable, disagreeable, irrational, and in direct 
onflict with common sense.  
omplete case available at provincialcourt.bc.ca 
Note-able Quote 
 
There are two types of leaders in the world today: 
hose who are interested in the fleece, and those who 
re interested in the flock” Author Unknown 
21
 NEW SUPREME COURT OF 
CANADA JUDGE APPOINTED 
 
 
On August 8, 2002, Madame 
Justice Marie Deschamps was 
appointed from the Quebec 
Court of Appeal to the Supreme 
Court of Canada. Chief Justice 
McLachlin stated, “Justice 
Deschamps is a dedicated judge, 
who brings to the Court a wealth of expertise and 
experience”. Canada’s top court is comprised of nine 
justices, three of which must be from Quebec.  For 
more information on the Supreme Court of Canada, visit 
their web-site at www.scc-csc.gc.ca 
 
RIGHT TO COUNSEL MUST  
BE REAL 
R. v. Jacobs, 2002 BCPC 0227 
 
The accused was taken to the police 


























responsibility for facilitating contact with counsel on 
the detainee’s behalf, they must take all reasonable 
steps to ensure the right to counsel is real, not simply 
theoretical. In determining what are reasonable steps, 
the court will examine what steps the detainee may 
have taken if they were provided the means to do so. In 
this case, the officer only called one of the phone 
numbers in the telephone directory listing for the 
accused’s lawyer. Had the accused been given a fully 
functional telephone and the directory, it would have 
been his responsibility to call the numbers and would be 
reasonable to conclude he would have called both 
numbers and been reasonably diligent in doing so. In 
short, the accused “was a detainee whose liberty and 
rights were being limited by the state at that moment” 
and the police had “a duty to do at least as much as 
[he] reasonably would have done”. The Certificate of 
Analysis was excluded and the charges were stayed. 
 




Fonseca, an unscrupulous lawyer for 
V
Asamples. After the booking process, 
he requested an opportunity to 
speak to a local lawyer. He was 
laced in a phone room that had a receiver, but no dial 
ad. The procedure in place was for the police or jail 
taff to make the call on the detainee’s behalf, then 
ransfer the call to the phone room. This process 
revents the detainee from speaking to persons other 
han counsel. Although the accused’s lawyer was not on 
n available list of local lawyers, the officer did locate 
 listing in the phone book with an office, home, and fax 
umber. The officer called only one of the numbers, 
ut could not recall at trial which one he had dialed. 
he phone rang, but there was no answer. After the 
fficer informed the accused that there had been no 
nswer, the accused requested Legal Aid. He 
ubsequently spoke with a Legal Aid lawyer for 3-4 
inutes. During a voire dire on the impaired driving and 
ver 80mg% charges, the accused argued that his 
.10(b) Charter right had been violated because the 
olice failed to take adequate steps to contact his 
ounsel of choice and the Certificate of Analysis should 
e excluded under s.24(2). 
 detainee has the right to counsel of their choice and 
he police took away the accused’s ability to implement 
hat right himself when they provided him a telephone 
ithout a dial pad. Once the police assume 
a man arrested for murder, bribed a 
man on the jury to hold out for a 
verdict of manslaughter. The jury 
was out for a very long time, and 
finally they returned with a verdict 
of manslaughter. Fonseca rushed up to the juror. 
“Here’s your money,” he said. “I’m much obliged to you, 
my friend. Did you have a very hard time?” “Sure did,” 
replied the man, “an awfully hard time. The other 
eleven wanted to acquit.”34 
 
CONSENT OF OWNER 
OVERRIDES PRIVACY INTEREST 
OF TEMPORARY HOUSEGUEST 
R. v. Scheck, 2002 BCSC 1046 
 
The accused, an 18 year old female, 
resided rent free in a spare bedroom 
olume 2 Issue 8 
ugust 2002 at her grandmother’s home, but 
could only stay there if she obeyed 
the rules of being home by midnight, 
keeping the bedroom tidy and clean, behaving herself, 
and having no one else in the house. Because the 
accused failed to keep her room neat, her grandmother 
would enter the room to clean it up. When the accused 
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34 Source: Behrman, Sid. (1991). The Lawyer Joke Book. New York, NY.: Dorset 
Press. 
 complained to her grandmother about this, the 
grandmother asserted that she could do what she 
wanted in her own house. After being informed that 
the accused was involved in a relationship with a drug 
dealer, the grandmother entered her bedroom and 
found a sock under the bed mattress containing money 
and plastic bags. This was reported to the RCMP and 
two officers attended the residence. The officers 
were invited in and located the sock stuffed with 
money and cocaine between the mattress and box 
spring. One of the officers testified that he 
considered obtaining a warrant but concluded it was not 
necessary because the homeowner had invited him in. 
At trial on a charge of possession of cocaine for the 
purpose of trafficking, the accused argued that her 
right to be secure from unreasonable search and 
seizure protected under s.8 of the Charter had been 
violated and the evidence should be excluded under 
s.24(2).  
 
Section 8 of the Charter protects the person, not 
property, and a person asserting the right does not 
require a propriety or possessory interest in the 
premises searched or articles seized. Although a 
warrantless search is presumptively unreasonable, the 
accused must first establish a reasonable expectation 
of privacy in the place searched or items seized if s.8 
is to be engaged. In this case, British Columbia 
Supreme Court Justice Meiklem found the accused 
could not demonstrate a reasonable expectation of 
privacy. She was not present at the time of the search 
nor had her grandmother relinquished the right to 
enter or exercise control over the room she owned. The 
spare room was being used temporarily and gratuitously 
by the accused and the door did not have a lock. If the 
accused left the door closed when she left the home, 
she found it open when she returned. Despite 
testifying to a subjective privacy expectation, it was 
not objectively reasonable in the circumstances. 
Furthermore, even if the accused had an expectation 
of privacy, it could be overridden at the discretion of 
her grandmother. Her grandmother consented to the 
search, which was both voluntary and informed. There 
was no breach of the accused’s rights and the evidence 
was admissible.  
 




“Tell me and I’ll forget. Show me and I may remember. 
Involve me and I’ll understand” Confucius 
 
POLICE LIABLE IN CUSTODIAL 
DEATH OF INTOXICATED MAN 
Roy et al. v. Attorney General of Canada 
et al., 2002 BCSC 1021 
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August 2002 stepchildren of a man who died in 
police custody, brought an action 
under the Family Compensation Act 
alleging the police were negligent in 
ailing to seek medical treatment for his intoxicated 
ondition. The plaintiffs sought damages for loss of 
uidance, loss of financial support, and loss of 
ousehold services. The deceased, who was 56 years 
ld, was arrested by police for being intoxicated in a 
ublic place under the Liquor Control and Licensing Act 
fter a citizen called police to report observing a drunk 
ale stumble to the ground while trying to get into his 
ar. The attending officer found a male lying on the 
round and concluded he was severely intoxicated. 
ollowing the attendance and assistance of a second 
fficer, the deceased, who was non responsive, was 
icked up, carried to, and placed in the back of the 
olice vehicle. He was transported to the police station 
here he was placed on a blanket and dragged to the 
drunk tank”.  
is personal effects were removed and he was rolled 
nto the recovery position in the event he vomited. 
lthough he was drowsy, had difficulty communicating, 
nd very limited physical reaction to his surroundings, 
o medical check was performed. About 23 minutes 
fter being booked in, the jail guard checked the 
eceased and found his snoring and breathing had 
topped. Attempts to revive him were unsuccessful and 
e was transported to and later pronounced dead at 
he hospital. The most likely cause of death was acute 
lcohol ingestion. This occurs when large amounts of 
lcohol are consumed and act as a central nervous 
ystem depressant, leading to coma, respiratory 
epression, and eventually respiratory arrest. If timely 
edical intervention is sought and the alcohol toxicity 
etected, death can be averted. To be successful in a 
awsuit alleging negligence, the plaintiff must establish 
he following: 
 the police owed the deceased a duty of care; 
 the police breached the standard of care 
expected; and 
 the death was a proximate cause of the breach of 
the standard of care. 
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 Duty of Care 
 
The police owe prisoners in their custody a duty of 
care, particularly when a prisoner is intoxicated. 
Intoxicated persons are vulnerable and an arrest for 
being drunk in public is often founded in a concern 
about the person’s safety. “The standard of care to 
which the police are held is that of “a reasonable police 
officer, acting reasonably and within the statutory 
powers imposed upon [them], according to the 
circumstances of the case””. Police policy manuals may 
assist the court in determining the standard of care. In 
this case, the RCMP national policy required an 
incarcerated person who is “not fully conscious” 
medically examined while the provincial and detachment 
policy required a person of “questionable consciousness” 
to be medically assessed. A state of reduced mental 
awareness, in which a person is not readily responsive, 
may prevent a prisoner from communicating their 
symptoms to the police or request assistance. 
Furthermore, diminished awareness may mask other 
serious conditions, preventing their detection while 
other medical conditions may mimic the symptoms of 
alcohol intoxication. The prisoner, being under the 
control of the authorities, is entirely dependent on the 
police to obtain medical assistance on their behalf.  
 
After weighing the risks to the prisoner and the 
burden on the police in having prisoners medically 
assessed, British Columbia Supreme Court Justice 
Neilson concluded that the standard of care must be 
conservative and where there is any doubt about the 
prisoner’s level of awareness, they should be medically 
assessed. Notwithstanding however, prisoners who are 
intoxicated, but consistently responsive to their 
environments, may be incarcerated without an 
examination. The standard of care also “imports a 
requirement that the officer dealing with the prisoner 
conduct an appropriate investigation in making a 
determination as to the prisoner’s level of awareness”. 
Neilson J. stated: 
 
[I] would expect such an assessment to include, at a 
minimum, an attempt to converse with the person about 
how much he or she has had to drink, and what other 
causes there may be for his or her condition. I would 
expect some attempt to make him or her respond to 
basic commands to assess the level of awareness. I would 
expect the officer do a basic physical examination to 
determine if the person has suffered any injuries, and 
whether the vital signs such as pulse and breathing are 
stable. I would also expect the officer to investigate the 
circumstances in which he or she was found, including 
speaking to available witnesses about their observations. 
If these enquiries show the prisoner’s responsiveness is 
minimal, or if they do not reveal sufficient information for 
a police officer to reach a conclusion that the prisoner is 
conscious and not in jeopardy, the standard of care 
requires the officer err on the side of caution and take 
the prisoner for medical examination before he or she is 
incarcerated. 
 
Breach of the Standard of Care 
 
Because the deceased was in a state of “questionable 
consciousness” showing signs of severe intoxication, the 
officers had a duty in accordance with the standard of 
care to determine whether he required a medical 
examination before incarceration. Since the police “did 
not perform any adequate assessment or investigation 
into [the deceased’s] state of consciousness or its 
cause”, they failed to meet the standard of care 




Neilson J. concluded that if the deceased had been 
medically assessed, the progression of his respiratory 
distress would have been identified and he would have 
received immediate assistance to save him. Thus, the 
breach of the standard of care was a proximate cause 
of the prisoner’s death. However, the court also 
recognized that the deceased “was not a passive 
participant” in his death and had self-ingested a large 
amount of alcohol placing himself at risk. This self-
induced intoxication was a basis for finding the 
deceased 50% responsible for his own death. The 
plaintiffs were awarded damages for loss of guidance, 
loss of financial support (past and future), and loss of 
household services, which were reduced by half due to 
the deceased’s contributory negligence. 
 




“I am frequently struck by the sense that we spend very 
little time considering evidence which the Crown hopes 
will prove the defendant was driving while…impaired, and 
the majority of the time putting the police officers on 
trial regarding their investigation35” BCPC Associate 
Chief Judge Stansfield 
 
                                                 
35 R. v. Jacobs, 2002 BCPC 0227. 
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